> UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY SURVEY METHODOLOGY: NEW DEVELOPMENTS HAROLD CLARKE AND MARIANNE STEWART
> April 30,2008

BE IT REMEMBERED that the aforementioned proceedings were heard on the 30th day of April, 2008, beginning at 10:09 a.m., at the University of Houston, 4800 Calhoun, Heyne Building, Room 135, Houston, Texas 77004, reported by Dorothy A. Rull, a Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Texas, as follows, to-wit:

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## A P P EARANCES

HOST:
Jim Granato, Ph.D.
SPEAKERS:
Harold D. Clarke, Ph.D. Marianne C. Stewart, Ph.D.

## CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY:

Mike Angel
GENERAL PUBLIC

PROCEEDINGS
MR. GRANATO: Okay. I would like to
bring this talk, workshop to a beginning here. As we go through the process of devising a plan for the Houston Region Panel Study, one of the issues and challenges that the prior workshop discussed was the issue of mode. And I could think of no better individuals to discuss the evolution of mode and the future challenges dealing with mode, that is, how we collect our survey data, than Marianne Stewart and Harold Clarke, who have not only a national reputation, but an international reputation in survey methodology.

One of the things that they do is they are PIs for the British National Election Study, which next to the American National Election Study, is probably one of the most prestigious in the world. Certainly at NSF when I was there, this was considered one of the top studies in the world.

So the structure of the discussion is going to be two hours long. They're going to present evolution of the process, some contemporary issues that they're dealing with in their own research, and then there will be a question-and-answer session.

Without further delay, I would like to introduce Harold Clarke and Marianne Stewart.

MR. CLARKE: Marianne is going to begin.
MS. STEWART: Well, thank you for joining
us today. Today gives us an opportunity to do at least two things, one is to be part of a formative stage for the Houston study and, second, and relatedly to talk with you or speak to you about our experiences doing large-scale surveys in a variety of places, including Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

Our presentation or talk with you today will have three or four parts. First, I want to give you an overview of surveys. I'll try and do that in as concise and as helpful way as possible. Second, we'll talk with you about where we are now. Harold will particularly talk about the use of Internet and face-to-face survey in a large heterogeneous population, the U.K. Third, we'll talk about into the future.

Now, there are a lot of things to think about with regard to surveys and what they might look like as they unfold, evolve and then evolution in a biology way, if you will, over the next decade or so.

There are two points that we want to address with you today. One has to do with what the future capabilities of devices such as Internet will allow all of us to do. A key point here is that the Internet mode, much more than any other modes that
surveys have been used with or for, really is a very, very democratizing mode. All of a sudden, it allows people to do research who previously have been deprived of doing any kind of survey work at all. The second point I want to discuss with you focuses on technology and demography. So I'll come back on those in just a moment.

The overview part of the presentation today, the first part, kind of where have we been, what's been the past, there are three or four bits that $I$ want to mention to you. One is just a very brief chronology of survey work. The second has to do with what are the goals of most surveys, at least, goals of most social surveys or political surveys. The third point has to do with what are some of the key questions in survey design. And then the fourth point has to do with mode and mode comparisons. And so each of these four points in the first part cumulates, if you will.

The first bit, the overview or the historical chronology, most survey texts will tell you it's really very difficult to determine when the first surveys were done. We know, based on the written record, that during the time along the period of the Roman Empire, there were orders from Rome to have census done. We also know that in the aftermath of conquest of the
U.K., Britain, in 1066, the Dome's Day record was commissioned, collected, and still to this day constitutes a very interesting historical archive.

We skip through time to the late 19th Century, and this is when we really first begin to see social surveys being done. And these social surveys in the late 19th Century focused on two questions. First of all, they focused on social conditions; and secondly, they focus very specifically on conditions of poverty in urban centers in the United States and the United Kingdom.

We move forward a bit further. In the mid 1930s, we now see George Gallup introducing or initiating his political polling. 1946 brings together academic and market researchers to form AAPOR, American Association of Public Opinion Research. It has its counterparts in a variety of countries. Their key point is to ensure the integrity of survey work.

1950s and '60s, particularly on the heels of some dramatic failures in political polling or political forecasting, especially coming off the 1948 election, we begin to see much more rigorous methodologies being used for personal or face-to-face interviewing. In the '50s and '60s, face-to-face is the dominant mode. In the '70s and '80s, it's telephone
interviewing. '80s, '90s, we move more into the mail-back mode. Today, Internet is not the dominant mode, but it is the mode that's capturing a lot of people's attention because of its potential.

Today, then, there are surveys sponsored by government agencies, private corporations, universities and colleges, private consulting companies, advertising agencies. The key point is that surveys are prevalent and most of us know that.

The second bit, if you will, of this overview section, what are the goals of most surveys, most social surveys? Essentially, there are four goals. The first is to try to get a sense of a distribution of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors among a population of interest. The second has to do with trying to discern or identify changes or trends in those attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. The third involves identification of group differences, again, in attitudes, beliefs and behaviors. And a fourth -- and the trickiest goal, if you will -- is to try to be able to locate or again identify causal patterns in order to make interesting and hopefully important causal inferences about connections in these attitudes, beliefs and behaviors.

To achieve those goals, survey design becomes critical. And this is the third bit, if you
will, of our introduction. There are lots of things to think about when we design surveys, what populations should be studied. That's a question we're going to come back on later in the presentation in the third part, if you will, on technology and demography. Another question is who should be interviewed. And a third question is how should the data be collected.

This third question leads us directly into the last bit of the introduction in the overview and that has to do with mode of data collection. There are several modes as I have already mentioned; face to face, telephone, mail-back or self-completion, and Internet. And each of those -- next slide, Merrill. Thank you.

Each of those, when you're thinking about which of them to use, are critically important, which combination of them to use depending on the research question you have can be compared in terms of several dimensions. One dimension -- and the dimension you hear most frequently -- has to do with what's the cost of the interview. We're not going to go through all of this -all of the cells of the grid in complete detail.

But in sum, face-to-face interviewing is extremely expensive. Current estimates for a 2009/10 British Election Study is approximately 325 pounds per interview. That's 700 -- roughly at current exchange,
\$700 per interview, okay. If you're going into ethnic minority communities where you have to do face-to-face interviewing and you have a lot of cultural conditions to think about, the estimated cost per interview, at least, doubles and possibly trebles. So it is very expensive. Telephone interviewing used to be considered inexpensive. That's no longer true. Mail-back is cheap. Internet is still relatively inexpensive.

A second dimension to think about is what the response rate is. This is a key point on all of these modes. Generally speaking, face to face is considered to have the best or largest response rate. Harold mentioned some of the key face-to-face surveys done in the U.S., also, in the U.K. are about 62 percent.

Telephone in the mid '90s, it was argued, achieved response rates of about 70 percent. That's no longer true. Our best estimate is probably about 20 percent on telephone.

MR. KLINEBERG: 20 percent?
MS. STEWART: 20 percent on telephone.
MR. CLARKE: It depends. It varies
widely, and it's hard to get the figures as well. You know, they use different denominators, different ways of measuring it.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How you measure
it?
MR. CLARKE: Our friend and colleague, David Sanders estimates, in the U.K., for major agencies, reputable places you go to to do telephone surveys, the true response rates are probably closer to 5 percent than 20 percent, so...

MR. KLINEBERG: Oh, geez.
MS. STEWART: Mail-back response rates may be about 10 percent. Internet, at least based on our experience, you can get 50 percent -- achieved response rate of 50 percent or higher, okay.

A third dimension we'll talk about is length of interview. The key cost of face to face is getting the interviewer to the door. Once the interviewer gets to the door and in the house, it doesn't matter -- it matters to the respondent. It may not matter to the interviewer -- whether she's there for an hour or two hours or three hours. You don't send interviewers to people's houses or places of employment for five minutes, okay. That's just not cost effective. So you can do relatively lengthy surveys face to face.

Telephone, it's about 20 minutes on the phone before people hang up. And mail-back, they used to be considered almost infinite in their length, but now the best estimate is probably about 40 or 50 questions
depending on how you define question.
Internet, you can probably capture them for about 100 to 120 questions for a major survey. But there are all sorts of conditions and cautions to think about. So the point of story is that face to face does tend to be longer. Mail-back, phone are briefer. Internet, somewhere in between.

A couple of other dimensions and then we'll turn this over to Harold. One dimension has to do with what's called "candor of the interview" and this has an enormous implication for data quality. The candor of the interview, just among other things, means how freely does the respondent feel in terms of his or her ability to respond to questions. We know that there are a number of interviewer bias effects introduced in face to face simply because you're sitting there and you're talking with another human being across from you; you don't know who that person is and you're not as likely to say some things that you might, you know, if you're in "a private circumstance" such as on the Internet. You get more candor on the Internet. You get more candor face to face. You get less when there's another person who is conducting your interview.

The final bit I'll mention has to do with data collection time, and here a large face-to-face
interview can be in the field for anywhere from two months and longer, which means the real world has the opportunity to intervene and change people's attitudes. The Internet typically is in the field for about two days. Data come back very quickly.

Okay. Harold, do you want to talk a bit more about...

MR. CLARKE: Marianne has, you can see, a bit of an allergy and maybe a cold, but I'll pinch-hit here. I will carry on with this particular point.

It's very a important point theoretically and that's the time with which it takes for you to gather the data that you're interested in. Marianne mentioned that traditionally face-to-face surveys, again, many of these things we're never worried about, but theoretically we should.

Your traditional ANES or CES or BES post-election survey will be in the field for anywhere from six weeks to three months typically. And most of your catch will come in the first month, but still a discernibly large portion comes in later. And you can satisfy yourself very easily that the world has intervened. If you're asking people, for example, about what were the most important issues facing the country when they were making up their mind how to vote, you'll
have -- numbers that I know from the British 2005 study, a lot of them were mentioning things that were occurring, you know, six weeks, two months later and saying that this is what determines their vote back in May and then something happened in July.

So if we're thinking in terms -- one of the big things that we're interested in, of course, is the dynamics of political behavior, social attitudes, economic evaluations, and what have you. We assume that $T$ and $T$ minus 1 can be really anything we want them to be. But of course, theoretically, that's crazy. Psychologists are going to tell us right away that your assumption that it takes a month for people to update their opinions about something, that's wild. It's bizarre. It doesn't make any sense at all. And so there is an irreducible problem with traditional, in-person surveys in this regard; and it's been there from the beginning and it will always be with us.

I would emphasize, also, the point Marianne made about the democratization of research. We're talking about within the community of scholars, of course. Because any of you who have been -- Jim, of course, was a political science director at the NSF. Marianne was, and other people have been on panels and so on. And you will see right away that the chunk of money
that's taken by the major survey projects, like the ANES and political science in the United States, BES in Britain and so on, takes a huge chunk of that budget.

And typically nobody else can come in and say, "Gee, I really want to do some study. I want to study this election. I need some survey data." They'll say, "Well, go use the ANES data. They'll be ready in a year. You can use those."

You can say, "But they don't ask the right questions and they don't do the stuff that we want to do." And they say, "Well, tough." And that's really the way it's been for 50 years. And as a result, an awful lot of very good research has never been done.

Now, that changes with other modes. Telephone helps, to be sure, and not as much as it used to.

Mail-back questionnaires can help. Of course, they're incredibly, incredibly cheap. They have problems as well, of course.

Internet is incredibly good in this regard. You get vast amounts of data. Lots of people can be involved. Cost considerations are minimal. And the speed with which data are gathered is extremely fast.

What we're going to talk about this morning, in particular, is an experiment that we did in

2005 concerning the quality really of data that we can gather for a particular type of survey. We're interested in voting behavior in elections. And one of the things that we want to know, given the considerations I just met, is can we get high quality data via the Internet? It has all these advantages in terms of cost, time, et cetera, et cetera, its possibilities for experimentation, which I'll talk about a little bit later. It has all these really neat things.

But the data, are they just garbage and/or are they good data? Are they data comparable in quality, at least, to what we get from traditional sort of gold standard studies, such as the ANES or BES face-to-face survey in the United States.

In Canada, Canadians went very easily from face to face to telephone in the late 1980s under the leadership of Dick Johnston and Andre Blais, moved -simply for cost reasons. Can't afford it. Canada is a big country, small population, spread out, can't afford that anymore. Well, let's do telephone. So they just did it, and it was done quickly.

They produced some, I think, very high quality interesting studies. They recognized -- Dick recognized immediately the possibilities, the leveraging the opportunities of the telephone surveys and produced
these rolling cross-sections, a design that he worked theoretically with Henry Brady in the survey operation at Berkeley. Some very interesting ideas. So they really represent, for RDD, that brand of survey, I call it the CES gold standard. And so what we're doing with the British case is really trying to see whether we can come up with an Internet standard really which approximates these.

One of the big -- you know, there are a couple of big things. You think about doing these studies. One, of course, is the idea that Internet surveys, you can't get a list. Can't get a sample. Can't do probability sampling in a traditional way. Whereas for the in-person and RDD surveys, of course, we can do probability samples; right? That's one of their great virtues. Leslie Kish really codified all this stuff for us long, long ago and provided really sort of the theoretical basis, the underpinning of why do people really believe this stuff. "Well, because of this," okay. If you can believe this -- if you're willing to believe the traditional Naman Pearson kind of statistical inference machinery, if you buy that and you know how these examples are drawn, then you can say, "Okay. Yeah. We can proceed. This fits hand in glove. Away we go."

The problem, of course, is that anybody can get a list. I can get a list easy, you know, in most cases for a lot of the surveys. Not all of them, but a lot of them we can get a list. In Canada, it was very easy for us, I'd say, early on to get a list. In Britain, it's easy to get a list. Not quite as easy in the United States.

We get the list, but that doesn't mean that people answer -- they're willing to be respondents. I can knock on your door, $I$ can send you a letter and invite you, but you may ignore me. You know, you can simply opt out.

Now, when Angus Campbell and his colleagues began doing the American National Election Studies back in the 1950s -- actually, the first one I think was done in 1948 -- response rates were really high by contemporary standards. And indeed I can remember when I started doing the Canadian National Election Studies back in the 1970s, we had extensive conversations, of course, with our survey firm. We never talked about response rates. We just assumed they could go out and get the data. We drew the sample -- my colleague, Larry LeDuke and I actually drew the sample, gave them, "Look, here they are. You're going to go to these constituents. These are going to go into these
wards. You're going to go to these places, and here are the names we want." And we'd just assumed they'd bring them back, okay.

In the 1950s, the published data from the ANES, you know, says that they were drawing 85 percent response rate. The response rate for the 2004 ANES was 62 percent. The British figures are almost identical. It's interesting. British figures are almost identical with one exception. In 2001, when we first did the British Election Study, our survey firm there at that time was NOP in the first study. They went down as low as 52 percent, 51-point-something percent. That was judged unsatisfactory both by the ESRC, which is like the British NSF, and by us the PIs. And so that was a big deal for us when we interviewed survey firms for the 2005 study, and we drove rates back up to 62 percent. But still that's a long way away from the full sample, let alone the 85 percent, you know, that we were drawing back in the 1950s.

And you have to be incredibly heroic, I think, to assume that people who are not answering are just -- that that's a normal missing. And those units of nonresponse, that the idea is those people are somehow just a random subset of everybody else and it's just in the error term that they're not there is, I think, a very
heroic assumption. You wouldn't want to make that. That just doesn't seem simple. Like I say, if it's just too simple to be true, it's probably not right; and I'm sure it's not.

So unit nonresponse, as we fancy that people won't answer our questions, is now very large in both in person and RDD. Massive in RDD in some cases, in the British case, for example.

Internet surveys on the other hand, of course, are nonprobability samples, with the exception of knowledge networks. We'll talk a little bit about how these different firms -- you know, how do they get a list of people to talk to. And the general way that it's done, of course, is to -- in one way or another to advertise, you know, "Join our panel," of Internet respondents, whether it be for YouGov, which is the firm that we work with in the U.K., or Harris Interactive or Polimetrix, which is now owned by YouGov by the way. They have bought a controlling share in Polimetrix. Or in the case of Knowledge Networks, which was founded by Doug Rivers and Norman Nie about 10 years ago now, what they did, they said, "Oh, well, what we'll do is we'll use an initial telephone contact with people" and say, "Hey, come and join our Internet panel. We will give you a computer or an Internet device. And if you will agree,
you can have this thing for a year or however long they specified. All you have to do whenever that red light comes on is to answer our surveys." And some of the surveys had to do with political. Some had to do with toothpaste, et cetera. You know, they had commercial clients and so on. And that was their model.

Now, that model is an interesting one, but it suffers. Of course, if you can't get people to respond to your telephone to begin with, then this is not going to work as well as you would -- as you would like. And, also, if I believe Doug Rivers -- of course, he's party free now to some extent, having moved over to Polimetrix. I don't know what kind of noncompete agreement he had. Not a very strong one evidently. But in any event, he tells us that there are lots of problems in terms of people dropping out of the Knowledge Network's panel very early. I don't know if that's true or not.

It's hard to get good information. One of the points about trying to get research on how to do this stuff is that everybody you talk to has got a horse -- or a dog in this fight and a horse in this race, and so it's hard to get really good information sometimes.

But certainly the big rap on the Internet
surveys is they're nonprobability samples. People have to opt in. The big rap sampling now from the RDD and in person is they opt out at any moment.

MR. KLINEBERG: So it's hardly an
improvement.
MR. CLARKE: And the question is, is opting out better than us going out? You can think about ways you might want to do this experimentally and so forth, but this is really sort of what the debate is about now. Clearly, it seems to me it sort of maintains the hypothesis here, to start with, is that all modes have selection biases, okay, and they're nontrivial.

Okay. What we did in the 2005 BES was to try to design a study that would allow us, from the point of view of political science, okay -- and that's what, you know, people in the different social sciences have different interests -- as political scientists, we say, "Gee, they've got all this great stuff we can do with the Internet if we can believe it, if we believe the results." It has all the advantages that I talked about in terms of cost effectiveness, speed, size of sample, experimentation, et cetera, et cetera. But can we believe this stuff?

Some people are very traditional -- our friend Jon Krosnick at Stanford and others say, "No. You
can't believe this stuff." Well, yeah, these guys are serious, so you better pay attention to what they have to say. You don't want to gather data which are garbage and are no good. You want good data.

And so what we did was to design a study where we have two parallel streams of data gathering, okay. One is the traditional British Election Study face to face. It's a panel, because we do -- it's like the American National Election Study with a pre/post design. Except, unlike the ANES, we top off the post-election wave to make sure we have as representative as possible post-election survey.

So we go into the field just before the campaign begins. And of course, in Britain, that's not terrible easy sometimes because you're typically at the discretion of a -- at the majority level, it's going to be at the discretion of the Prime Minister when he decides to ask the Queen to dissolve Parliament. But we could usually make pretty good guesses as to when this is going to occur, and we've been lucky.

But anyway right before the election begins, the campaign begins, we go into the field -recognizing how long it takes to do in-person surveys, as I mentioned before, we actually -- since we thought the election would be called right around April Fool's Day,
interestingly enough, and it was. It was delayed for a couple of days because of the death of the Pope, as it turned out in 2005, but we started in mid February. So we'll have most of the stuff done -- of these interviews done. We didn't want to start too early because we wanted to have a measure -- you know, like I talked to you about time before. We want to compress it as much as possible, so we started in about the end of the second week of February. Then we have preelection. Then precampaign. Then immediate post election, the day after the election, we start in. And again it takes a couple of months for this to be completed. And then for experimental purposes, we asked all these people whether or not they had an Internet address, and then we came back to them a year later.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just a clarifying question. I know in England there's a tradition of quota sampling, and I'm assuming that wasn't what was done in this case.

MR. CLARKE: Oh, no. No. What we did -the British Election Studies were modelled right from the get-go on the American model. In fact, on Stokes, went over and spent a term at Nuffield College working with David Butler. They have always been probability samples, sort of gold-standard sample.

There are a number of firms in Britain that we don't really hear very much about who sort of do quasi-governmental kind of operations, working for the national statistical office and so forth. They have always used probability. I guess, as a political scientist, at least, we don't hear about them. If you're a socialist or a demographer, you probably know these studies quite well. This is to say this is what we're talking about.

In Britain, like the United States as well, there's a tradition -- a long tradition of face-to-face quota sampling with commercial pollsters, firms such as ICM, MORI -- in particular, Robert Wooster at MORI -- Gallup, of course, Bob Wybrow at Gallup for many, many years did quota sampling. Those guys only moved off quota sampling in the early '90s after the debacle of the polling firm's inability to predict the outcome of the 1992 general election.

And at that time, they did two things. Some of them -- virtually all of them really went to RDD is what they did, telephone surveys. A few decided they would only do a survey now and then and went to try to do face-to-face probability study or some mixture thereof. Try to get sort of -- the very last poll they would do before an election would be sort of the Cadillac or

Mercedes kind of things face-to-face probability and otherwise do RDD.

For us, this is RDD. This is strictly ANES, the BES is like in terms of how it proceeds.

Paralleling that, though -- and this is the experiment -- is down here. It is the 2005 British Election Study Internet campaign, and it's actually a rolling campaign panel survey. Before the election begins, before the campaign begins, rather, we interviewed 8,000 people almost. And in this case, we could do it just on the weekend before the election begins because, again, the great speed of the Internet. We do not smear the interviews out over six or eight weeks, but rather over approximately -- virtually, it's all done in 48 hours, okay.

And then we took those 8,000 people and randomly interviewed about 200 of them every day during the period of the campaign. This is the Brady Johnson rolling campaign panel design. Then we interviewed everybody, even if they didn't participate here, if they had participated there, we tried to interview them again. "Interview," quote/unquote, to survey them again in the post-election survey, which again was completed. You know, we took the interviews for four or five days or surveys for four or five days, but virtually all were
done in about 48 hours.

Then notice this. A year later, we come back to these guys again and we're again back to everybody who had participated here. Notice the retention rate, which is really interesting. We have 6,186 of the original 8,000 respondents. All right. So you get very high panel retention, which we're very pleased with because we're very interested in the dynamics of particular attitudes and beliefs and behavior, particularly the dynamics of party support, party demonstration.

MS. STEWART: Merrill, there's a question.

MR. KLINEBERG: You know, you may have said it. I didn't understand it. Where did you get the e-mail addresses for that as well?

MR. CLARKE: Let me talk a little about, this is the design. Now, see, the idea -- the idea, of course, for us as political scientists, is the body of data that we gather via the Internet -- we use exactly the same questions, okay. We try to write as close as we could to match these question, question order, question wording, scales, looking at identical to the show cards you would see on the screen as opposed to the show card that would be administered face to face, to really match
these things. Then we said, okay, now we have a set of models of political behavior. And we've just published this in a book with Oxford called, POLITICAL CHOICE IN BRITAIN. And what we want to do is go back there, okay. This is based on the 2001 and earlier surveys. Let's take the model, the set of models -- and we have several different rival models, competing models, theoretically in form competing models of voting behavior and let's do this experiment.

Let's suppose that all we had in 2005 was the Internet data, the Internet data set, or all you had was the face-to-face survey. What happens in terms of the differences you would draw? Do you make different -because as political scientists, this is typically what we're after. We're not after point estimates as to which party is ahead in the horse race or something like this. We don't use the data for that.

And certainly, we don't use it as a record of what the voting shares were. The government is going to tell us that. We've got that. We have got umpteen polls giving us the horse race leading us to the election. We don't need that.

What we need is to be able to model things. We're not as interested in the means as we are in the poll variances, right. This is what's driving

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what we're doing.
MS. STEWART: Harold, to get back on that for just a moment, these e-mail addresses were requested from these respondents.
MR. KLINEBERG: So it's the face-to-face interviews?
MS. STEWART: Okay.
MR. KLINEBERG: Do you then ask, "Do you have an e-mail?"
MS. STEWART: Yes. That's these people. These people are part of the YouGov Internet pool. So YouGov has a variety of recruitment practices, some of which are proprietary -- actually proprietary to any Internet company, how do you get your respondents. Well, we're not going to tell you all that. We'll tell you some of the methods we used, so -- but these methods culminate in this pool, and that's how they get the e-mail addresses.
MR. CLARKE: Now, this one here, this out here was to say, "Hey, one of the interesting things is" -- is -- to use the sort of Knowledge Network's approach, in a sense. You say, hey, let's start off with a probability sample, but can we get high quality data by going back to those guys via the Internet? So we're going to mix the mode, and that's what this has to do
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with this thing here.
But for you guys, you say, okay, how do these guys get their respondents? How did you get these 6,000 or 7,000 , almost 8,000 people? As I say, there are a variety of ways.

But what YouGov does, the methodology they use -- and we can talk about the other firms as well. But in YouGov's case, what they do is they construct a big panel. They advertise. If you get up, you see these banner headlines on various web pages and so forth. You know, "Join the YouGov panel." And they may have a little sort of teaser, "Do you think that Beckham is the world's greatest football player? Vote now." So you click on that and then you give your answer, and you get invited to join the YouGov panel. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ahh. MR. CLARKE: And so they collect -- they build these panels. And YouGov terms -- I don't know how many hundred thousand people they have, a lot of them anyway. Polimetrix has, $I$ don't know, a million five or something now. YouGov not quite as big, but a lot.

And what YouGov does is to divide these up into a 48-cell demographic grid, okay. And they -you come along and you say to YouGov, "Gee, I would like to do a survey on pet food or whatever. We're launching
a new line, and we'd like to get some information. You know, does it look better if we had a Dalmatian on the can or a poodle," you know, or something like this. And so they say, "Okay. That's fine." And they will draw from this 48-cell grid. They will go ahead and draw proportionately a sample, then, you know, that looks like a sample from the panel that will be looking like what the census tells us the British electorate looks like.

MR. KLINEBERG: It's a quota sample.
MR. CLARKE: That's right.
So what's this thing really like? When people ask me like in two words, "What is it?" I say it's a quota sample.

Now, it also, though, has a waiting scheme built in because they achieve -- these guys here, this 7,793 represent 52 percent of the people that they contact, okay.

And so what they do, of course, is they impose weights after the interviews are over. They look and do post-stratification weighting designs. And they use standard -- or standard demographic characteristics that you would think of in terms of variables like age, gender, region, education and so forth. But they also use the British case newspaper readership. And newspaper readership, it turns out in Britain -- at least,
historical. Newspapers are in trouble in Britain. That's another story. But historically, newspapers in Britain are overtly partisan, okay, and people know it. And so if you want to have a political variable, which actually tells you something -- and it's interesting. In a number of analyses we've done adding newspaper readership into the analysis actually has additional predictive power in terms of a number of political attitudes. And YouGov guys know this. And, of course, they have designed -- they actually do a study every year, a big study with face-to-face interviewing to gather data on media consumption patterns. And they use these -- particularly newspaper readership -- as a weighting variable with their samples, okay. And so that's how YouGov does it. So this is what we have -this is what we have here. We'll talk a little later about other companies.

MR. KLINEBERG: How do you spell YouGov?
MR. CLARKE: Y-o-u-G-o-v.
MS. STEWART: Time for the next slide.
MR. CLARKE: Time for the next slide.
We'll come back. In fact, $I$ have a pretext right now if anybody wants to take it. I have got one we can do. We're going into the field.

So you can see this thing here. We're
not done with these guys. We are going in the field with them again now. It's not actually two years out, it's like two and a half years out or three years out. We're going back into the field with them this weekend, so if you want to become a YouGov panelist --

MS. STEWART: Quick comment on YouGov panels. It's also true for most Internet panels. As respondents stay in for about 50 survey administrations and then they go out because otherwise, you have got respondent fatigue and attrition problems.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How is YouGov compensating respondents?

MS. STEWART: They set up an account on their system. And so every time somebody answers, I think that it's a pound or two pounds now.

MR. CLARKE: 50P.
MS. STEWART: So they have to build up the account to 50 pounds and then a check or a deposit into their bank account or wherever.

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. We actually wanted to give them more because we really wanted to build that up. And they said, "No. Don't do. That will screw them up. They will get conditioned to expect two or three pounds." We give them 50 pound, and we compromise on a pound for our guys.

MR. KLINEBERG: So YouGov gets these numbers by inviting people to vote on funny things; right? So they get on the --

MR. CLARKE: That's right. They found them like sports, you know, Pop Idle.

MR. KLINEBERG: They followed up with a questionnaire to them asking, getting those demographic characteristics?

MR. CLARKE: What happens is, when you join the YouGov panel -- say I want you to join. At that point, they collect a series of standard demographics on the person, okay. And so when they have this big panel and this 48-cell grid, they can put you in your cell. They say, "Okay. Here he is. This guy is 50 years old. He lives in Colchester. He has a BA Ox on in," you know, whatever and so that's -- that's how they do it. And so they actually have you, you know, demographically pretty well sorted out, and then they've got your newspaper readership as well. They say, "Well, he studied at Oxford. Do you read a daily newspaper?" You say, "Yes." "Oh, which one?" "Oh, I read The Telegraph." Oh, okay, that's -- that -- or "I read The Daily Mail" or I read "The Scotsman" or whatever, you know.

MR. KLINEBERG: Someone has voted on

MR. CLARKE: That's right.
MR. KLINEBERG: And it gets funneled back, "Would you like to join this panel?"

MR. CLARKE: That's right. They have a -- yeah. They use a variety of recruitment devices.

They also buy lists from other companies. There are companies actually that do nothing but gather e-mail addresses. That's what they do for a living. And then a company like YouGov comes along, and they buy sample from these guys, potential sample from them.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: One more sample question.

MR. CLARKE: Sure.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I mean, in effect, you invited -- YouGov invited 15,000 and got roughly 50 percent?

MR. CLARKE: That's right. 52 percent.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Why the 15,000? I mean, you're comparing responses from 3,500 for your info, for your RDD, and 7500 or whatever. And normally if I was going to do a comparison, I'd want 3500 to 3500 [sic]. I mean, why would you choose the $15 ?$

MR. CLARKE: Well, we have got a variety of concerns, okay. This experiment -- and we'll talk -we weight these things later on. For certain purposes,
we do things differently.
But the idea is this, the main -- one of the main things we wanted to do with the Internet survey in addition to the experiment, the mode comparison experiment which I described a couple minutes ago, was of course to do the Brady Johnson rolling campaign survey. Now to do that, we would ideally like to have a sample of 1,000 people, independent draw every day, okay.

But even YouGov, you know, we didn't have the money to do this and, also, they said, "That will exhaust our panel. And, by the way, we're also doing surveys for the $B B C$ and et cetera, et cetera. We're not willing to exhaust our panel on you."

So we said, what we would like to have achieved end of about 8,000, okay. You tell us how many people you got to contact to get that because then we're going to divide those up into 30 daily replicates and whatever it was to get an achieved end with an attrition rate of about 200 a day, because then we can construct these moving rolling -- you know, these rolling panel surveys with our panel data, which we're going to put on our website and which we'll go down and talk to the BBC about, which we have a contract with and so on and so forth. So that was the other thing.

Now, when you come to do the mode
comparison, you say, "Well, gee, I'd like to have exactly the same number of people or what have you." Then, you know, that's -- they say, "Well, we can do that. We can easily achieve that. That's no problem."

But if you got in, you can always weight
it down. If you don't have in, weighting it up is comforting, but you're going to get smaller staired errors, but you know they're not -- this is not real, okay. So I'd rather weight down than weight up. And the other thing is it's cheap, as I say, so there's no reason not to go with big ends.

One of the problems -- now, here we come to the mode comparison. Ideally, we would not worry very much about marginals at all. We're only interested in co-variances ultimately. But nevertheless, it's interesting to take a look and see whether or not the face-to-face survey or the Internet survey, for that matter, or any other kind of survey actually matches the actual shares of the vote in the election. It's going to start there. There are so few things -- in social science, there are so few things, at least in political science, where we've got an objective sort of indicator out there, all right?

And one of them, of course, is vote shares after an election. We've got a pretty good idea.

Sometimes there may be some debates, as there have been in recent American elections and so on. But nevertheless, we usually have pretty good -- and Britain is really good about this. The British system is so great. We know who won. We know all the shares. It's fantastic. People get together in a room like this, and they count them up and then they make a report at 10 o'clock at night. Right, Guy, you have been there when they do this?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah. Sometimes a little later.

MR. CLARKE: Yeah, sometimes a little later. But, you know, it's so easy. It really looks like democracy. It's really amazing.

And so here is the result of just comparing the shares, okay. And you can see the Internet bar is the black bar. The gray bar is the actual vote share. The in-person survey was done by NatCen, which is National Center For Social Research, which does a great job historically of this stuff, one of the so-called Mercedes kinds of firms which we use for the face-to-face. And you can see these things are really close, okay.

And these are -- these are the data, the weighted data, using the standard YouGov weight and the
standard NatCen weight -- with data face to face, of course, with weights attached to them as well.

Here's a variable we can't compare, but it's a central variable in theories of electoral choice, party identification. And I would be very leery of any survey -- if there's a big discrepancy between the in-person and the Internet surveys on party ID, I would be worried right from the get-go.

And so we see again this is for the preand post-election surveys, the precampaign, that is, and post-election Internet survey. Pre/post face-to-face surveys. You can see those shares are really close. And the first two bars in each of the little groups of bars are the preelection comparison and then the last two are the post-election comparison. Strikingly, strikingly similar.

Okay. Now, here's a variable we all get wrong, okay. There's a couple that look like we're doing a pretty good job on. Here's one that's really -- here's one that's sort of scandalous in political science in terms of measurement.

MS. STEWART: Harold, please.
MR. CLARKE: No scandals in political science?

MS. STEWART: No.

MR. CLARKE: No scandals. Lots of politics, not much science.

MS. STEWART: It just gets worse.
MR. CLARKE: Okay. Here is what we got.
Actual turnout from Britain in 2005 -- actually updated that figure a little bit. Final figure was 61.4, I believe, but that's close enough. Internet, way off, 82.9. In-person, though, 71.7. 10 points roughly over the official.

This is the standard question. As you may know, over the years, there's been all sorts of debate on how to word this. I'm going to show you the next slide. It doesn't matter how you word it, okay. It doesn't work.

This is really cool. Here's a whole bunch -- these numbers here are overreports. These are the overreports in a whole bunch of surveys. The blue ones are -- blue bars are face to face. Yellow bars are RDD. And the red bar up here at the top is the 2005 BES Internet. And you can see, as I say, here is -- these numbers are scandalously far off. They always have been. They still are. There is some debate as to whether it matters or not. We'll come to that later, but you can see they are way off.

Look at the 2005 or 2002 ANES, for
example, telephone survey, off by nearly 40 points. Everybody in the sample basically said they voted, okay. Similarly, with Dick Johnston's Annenberg study in 2002 -- actually, Dick didn't direct that one, but he's back now -- and they have got about 90 percent of the people who say they voted.

MR. KLINEBERG: We get this on our surveys. 80 percent say they voted.

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. That's right. So everybody gets this way wrong, okay.

MS. STEWART: So to be clear, this is the British Election Study, the Canadian Election Study, the American National Election Study --

MR. CLARKE: And the NAES study, the Annenberg study.

MS. STEWART: -- and then the National Annenberg.

MR. CLARKE: I just pulled these out and said, let's look at a few recent ones here, along with -this is a track record for the BES over 11 surveys, off by about 10 percent. We do vote validation, by the way, just as a footnote to this as the NAES has done several times and will do again.

If you do that in Britain, you will find you will knock that number down by about 50 percent.

50 percent of what you have there is accounted by people misreporting, lying, in other words, as to whether they voted. They're practically all false positives, right, false negatives.

MS. STEWART: Which means they said they voted, but they didn't.

MR. CLARKE: That's right. That's right. And the rest of it, then, you say, "Gee, then why are we still getting this wrong?" Well, that's giving you some insight into the nature of the sample, okay?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You validated on both the Internet and the face to face?

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. And one of the things we haven't analyzed yet, but we were able to -- and we can with the help of the survey firm, of course, YouGov -- is that we do have -- I'm sitting on a data set which I have not looked at yet. We validated, vote validated, a sample of the Internet respondents. We went to the 128 constituencies that we used as our primary sampling units in the face to face to try to get a comparison. The problem -- we just ran out of money in terms of doing vote validation. Vote validation basically, in the British case, is you have to get graduate students and send them down to London and have them beg with -- actually now with a company called

Pickford's which is a private firm but collects government documents for the government -- and say, "Please, you know, give us the following -- you know, here we are from Colchester South or whatever constituency for this particular ward, this particular polling state. Give us that sack -- give us that information." And sometimes -- you know, mostly they do, but it's very labor intensive.

MS. STEWART: Sack of paper bells.
MR. CLARKE: Well, it's a report. It's actually a report. It's actually done at the constituency level, but you got to sort through it. We just didn't have enough money to do 7,000 of these guys, so we picked 128 -- say, 128 constituencies as we used for the face-to-face survey. But we can. The point is, yes, we can vote validate. And that will be really interesting to see how that works out.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Do you have a theory explaining the 10 percent difference between the face to face and the Internet?

MR. CLARKE: Right now, Allan McCutcheon who some of you may know who is the head of the Gallup Research Center at the University of Nebraska, and one of his colleagues are getting ready to submit a paper where they are actually studying this across a whole bunch of
countries, including -- I gave him the British data to work with very early on, and so they have got some models of that, some interesting stuff. That will be -- I think they're going to send that POQ.

MS. STEWART: What's his key conjecture?
MR. CLARKE: Well, he's got a variety. I haven't actually read the paper, but he's got some -- you know, some of that stuff has to do with who lies and like why and et cetera, et cetera. But $I$ don't know yet.

Okay. So what we want, though,
basically -- that stuff is sort of mood music, okay. Because as political scientists, what really matters to us is being able to make inferences about parameters in rival model, theoretically directed models of electoral choice. And so we had just, as I said, finished a book called POLITICAL CHOICE IN BRITAIN and we have got a variety of models there.

Well, let's just grab those models and let's estimate their parameters with the 2005 data, face-to-face and Internet, and let's impose parameter quality constraints and we do this in a variety of ways. We just did it with -- pooled our data and data interaction effects, very simple methodology.

And in our labor vote model, for example, these are standard binomial, multinomial logent models
and so forth. And some were regression models for leader images and what have you.

Key variables here in what we call the valance politics model of electoral choice, party identification, party best and most important issue, party leader images. Party ID, by the way, conceptualized very much along the lines of theory and Akin and others, not as a social psychological conception out of Michigan.

MR. KLINEBERG: What does that second one mean?

MR. CLARKE: Party best and most important issue, one of the things that is really striking in Canada, the United States, Britain, and probably in other countries as well is that issues people are concerned with tend to be what we call "valence issues," not positional issues. The press spends all sorts of time worrying about people's stands on same-sex marriage, abortion, issues like this, pro/con positioning, left/right ideologies and so on.

But when you ask voters about what's the most important issue, they don't talk about that. They talk about healthcare. They talk about the economy. They talk about high quality education for their children. They talk about security, personal security,
crime, terrorism, et cetera, et cetera. These are the things -- and these are all issues upon which everybody has got the same opinion. Everybody wants a healthy economy; right? There may be a few ghouls on Wall Street who are trying to short and so they may not want this. But basically this is not what they -- people want the same thing. They want personal security. They want high quality education for their children. They want high quality healthcare. These are the issues that people talk about.

The mix of those issues has changed over time, but as Don Stokes pointed out in his famous '63 article, his critique of "Spatial Models and Party Competition," valence issues dominate. You say, okay, when you ask people what are the issues that you're concerned about, they say, "Which party is best able to handle this issue?" All right. And this is really where the political debate typically ends. It's not what to do, but who can do it best, okay. Who can do it best.

And so that's -- that's that variable and that's very sort of -- it's a core variable in our valance politics models. But, of course, we test other -- other variables as well; Downsian party issue proximities; special attention to economic evaluations, which are part of the valence politics scheme; and in

2005, in Britain, of course, opinions about the Iraq War. Just as in the United States in 2006, in the British election in 2005, there were very widespread conjectures that the -- that people disaffection with the Iraq War would have important negative consequences for the Labour Party in that election, and so that's an interesting variable. And then tactical or what we call strategic voting as well, which has been a popular topic in British political science since the late 1990s.

Originally -- of course, the idea being you take your second choice in order to defeat a party that you really don't like. This kind of idea that you're really going to, if you will, maximize your utilities by taking into account party competition at the constituency level rather than just making a sincere vote.

Then some controls for demographics, particularly social class in the British context which we have beaten up pretty badly in our research, but nevertheless it's always one you want to take account of particularly, I think, in a mode comparison where there's a lot of discussion about coverage, of course, with the Internet, something we haven't talked about too much yet. But in the British case, somewhere over 70 percent now of people have regular -- had easy Internet access. So,
nevertheless, that's not 100 percent and that's demographically skewed, so you want to take a look at the demographics as well.

The story is really easy. The story from this -- from this analysis really astounded us. We didn't know what we'd find. We didn't really know what we'd find. But what we found was, both for the turnout model, which I haven't talked about here, but for these party choice models of which I'm just illustrating with a very simple logent analysis of voting labor, voting for another party here is that the inferences you draw are virtually indistinguishable by mode; that mode doesn't matter. It doesn't make any difference.

And indeed even at the detail level, as we'll see, you just sort of summarize here -- I did have a slide with all the little coefficients and all the standard errors up there, but there's about 50 of those I can show you. This paper is in Political Analysis by the way. It's published last summer in Political Analysis if you're interested in it, in the Journal of Political Analysis.

Anyway, the idea is that there's astounding similarities across modes. So it's not the case that you get a very different view of what matters for voting in Britain and what doesn't matter if I give
you the Internet data as opposed to the face-to-face data. You say, gee, the valence politics model dominates no matter how you do it. Social class doesn't matter. All those inferences right down to the level of ranking the variables by their -- the variables and the associated models by their explanatory power turns out to be exactly the same. And the model selection criteria testify exactly the same way.

MR. KLINEBERG: What was the AIC?
MR. CLARKE: The AIC and the BIC are what we call model selection criteria. Imagine you have rival models, typically rival non-nested models where you can't get from one to the other by simply imposing some sort of parameter constraints on $X$ to get $Y$ or so on. It's not just a question of looking at differences.

MR. KLINEBERG: There were some big
differences?
MR. CLARKE: Well, the big difference -the way to compare these -- let me go back. The way to compare them is across the issue. There sure are some big differences. There are big differences because sample sizes -- the comparisons we want -- the comparisons we want are really not the absolute size of these things, but you want to go -- better models have smaller AICs and smaller BICs, okay. So you have got to
rank order.

Here is our traditional, in-person
surveys, okay. And you've got this tournament of models. And you say, okay, were Butler and Stokes right that everything is class, all else is embellishment and detail? If you have this in-person data, no way. Class explains nothing, okay, and it never explained nearly as much as they claim, but that's another story.

So you rank order these competing models.
There's class. There's all the demographics. Economic voting. Apologies to Mike Lewis-Beck and Helmut Norpoth. Issue proximity, down, okay. Most important issues, scope, like the valence -- just like the quota valence politics model. Party ID under either a Michigan or a Rochester interpretation. Leader images. And then a composite model, which is the one that actually has significant predictors. You know, if you put them all together, this is the one that has got everything in it that's significant. There's a rank order there.

Compare that rank order with this rank order, okay. And you can do it in terms of the pseudo $R$ squared. You can do it in terms of the model selection criteria which -- of course, one thing all they really do is they impose a penalty on you for the richness of the parameterization because, as we all know, if I want to
explain everything, I just give you the data back, okay, there is Joe and Susie and Sam and so on. I can explain it, but that's really not terribly interesting, especially when you get older and your memory is not as good. We want parsimonious models. That's all I can carry around anymore.

So they're saying, "Hey, yeah. You can beat me with your models, but you have got 10 parameters and I only have two" or something like that. So I am going to discount your explanation in terms of the richness of your parameterization. The AIC and the BIC both do this. If you have a sample size any or greater, the BIC will give you a greater penalty for putting in extra parameters, but we practically always have that. Theoretically, it's argued recently the AIC is actually somewhat better. It doesn't really matter. That's another talk.

The key things for us is that this rank order here looks like this rank order there, amazingly so, amazingly so. They say, okay. So if I'm having a debate about what matters for voting in Britain and I give you the one data set and I have another one, we're going to reach the same conclusion. To me, that's a key point for political scientists because this is what we do basically. If we want just marginals, we're going to get
them from umpteen different firms now. Everybody is doing horse-race stuff, okay?

Here is some more. Very simple, just how good a job did we do in terms of predicting the vote. Now, here is one here. This shows exactly the same things here again, zoop, zoop, same rank order, very similar percentages as well, astoundingly similar.

Let me show you the next one. This is one that Bob Erikson suggested to me. When we sent the paper to Political Analysis, we got to revise and resubmit. He says, "Well, Harold, you know, one of the neat things you might do would be to cross-predict." Okay. So you take your model, estimated using the Internet data. You've got your parameters to your model. Take those parameters, put them into your face-to-face data and just try to predict the vote share doing that with that and then vice versa.

I said, "Oh, boy, there goes that paper. I'll never be able to do this, you know." So I remember on a Sunday morning I set this thing up, and I went like this (indicating). You know, I hit the computer and then looked back and there's the result.

MR. KLINEBERG: Wow.
MR. CLARKE: All right. Look at that. So I'm using the Internet parameters -- the parameters
generated using Internet data to predict Labour voting with the face-to-face data and vice versa. You get exactly the same result. So on the basis of this and parallel analyses for turnout, plus some stuff on marginals.

Now, we did stuff on just like do people like Tony -- one of the things that would be disturbing would be if in our face-to-face survey everybody is like, "Tony Blair, he's a dog. We hate him. We'll give him zero out of 10 on the scale," and then you've got 7 out of 10 as a mean like with the Internet people. You know, that kind of stuff would bug you, you know, or the rank orders like do they like Charles Kennedy better in the Internet than Tony Blair, and you get vice versa when you do face to face, that kind of thing.

So we did marginal stuff, too. And there were very, very few significant, significant differences. There were a few. There are a few. But in no two things -- they don't explain hardly knowing the variables. Let me explain. Like less than 1 percent -knowing the mode, you explain less than 1 percent of the variance.

Second thing in the variable in question -- excuse me. And the second thing was in no case were the stylized facts changed, okay. In no case
would you say, "Oh, gee, in my survey people really liked Tony Blair." I go, "Well, not in mine. They didn't like him in mine." I did Internet and they hated him, and you did face to face and they loved him. It's not like that.

There are small differences in some of the variables. They tend to be, I think, scale -there's still lots of things we need to know about how people respond to scales in the different modes and so on. But it looks like all we're doing in general, at most, is shifting the constant a little bit in terms of how we would model this. Of course, that's the inference that's coming very much from the model comparison study, right. That we made shifts of these constants, but we're not moving, we're not moving the covariant structures around and that's the key thing. So that is where we are in terms of what we have done with mode comparison.

Now, we have got a paper that we are doing at the -- just to give you some idea of the power the Internet in Britain. If you ever get a National Election Study award, you can be sure that very soon thereafter Hermann Schmitt and Ian McAllister from the -what's CSEC -- the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems will send you an e-mail asking you, begging you, telling you that you must --

MS. STEWART: Explaining that.

MR. CLARKE: -- improve the full CSEC election study module on your study. Well, this is like a 12-page thing, you know.

And so with our surveys, we typically have a self-completion mail-back questionnaire that goes with the face to face, but we also have 40 or 50 members in the user community in Britain who want to put questions on. And we typically use this device for expanding the data that we can gather. And it's the same people, of course, as the major face to face. So they've got all those data as well.

So if we do the CSES, put it on the mail-back, that's the end of the mail-back, okay, because you can't ask for a 30 -page mail-back. It ain't on. I mean, you can give it to people, but it's not going to come back, okay.

And so we said, "What are we going to do about this?" Well, in 2001, we just told McAllister and Scmitt to take a hike. "No, we're not going to do it. Sorry guys."

In 2005, we were tempted to do the same thing for the same reasons, however, we said, "No. We can do better than that. We're going to give you a complete Internet survey all your own. Most election, only your questions. Nobody in the world gives them what
they want, by the way, but we will. We're going to give you your questions, your entire module, start to finish free. That's 3600 respondents. And then we put a few questions at the end -- at the end, which allowed us then to compare the CSES measure of partisanship with the traditional British Election Study measure and so on. So we did this.

So we gave them those data. And then the CSES in their wisdom -- their board met and they said, "Oh, no. We couldn't accept the nonprobability sample." And I said, "Whoa. Wait a minute here. I know how you guys get your data in various countries." And so this is not -- this is not a wise decision.

So what they actually did, though, John Curtis and Steve Fisher from -- you know, Steve is at Oxford, and John is at Strathclyde, long affiliated with though Nuffield -- they got some money from the ESRC and did a self-completion, not a mail-back because John does the British social attitude survey. They went into the field in July, though. The election is in May. And they gathered a CSES module by self-completion paper and pencil questionnaire. That means we can compare.

So we have another mode comparison we're going to do at the APSA meeting where we compare our Internet CSES with theirs. Now, it's not a fair
comparison in the sense that they didn't get into the field until July. Of course, they would have got in earlier if they could, but that's not in the BSA study.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You still did the CSEC module on the Internet?

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. We did it on the Internet. But it's a totally separate survey, freestanding, done exactly the way. You know, in the wildest dreams of Ian McAllister, this is how he would do it, okay. And so we have a paper now which compares those two and again -- and against the BES face to face, okay.

And because that's one of the big questions with the SCES because they try to get questions which can be compared across like France, Canada, the United States, Britain, Botswana, everywhere, you know. And invariably, they don't ask the question -- or very often they wouldn't be the same question that you would find in the ANES or the BES survey. And so you could have people saying, "Well, British scholars" -- no, that doesn't matter. CSEC by doing the CSS British data -oh, yeah, it's a totally different model. And so we want for them to compare back to BES wherever possible face to face.

The results, of course, look a lot like
what I've just showed you. Just like we said. The same like -- it's the same thing.

MR. KLINEBERG: Probabilities don't matter --

MR. CLARKE: Not for modeling electoral choices, it doesn't matter.

MR. KLINEBERG: -- response rates don't matter.

MR. CLARKE: This is the inference because this is what we need to know, "Can we model what -- as political scientists, can we do this whole range of activities and do it well with the Internet surveys?" And we say, "Yes. In Britain, at least, you can." And that's one of the points.

I gave this talk at Washington State University last year, a version of this talk. And some of you may know Don Dillman, who is a very eminent survey researcher, has done a lot of work on mode comparisons, response rates and so forth. And he was sitting there; I could tell that he was uncomfortable with what I was saying. So finally he asked, "Well, I can't believe this." Well, the data are there. Go ahead and do it. It's a pretty simple analysis. I don't think we made any errors here, but it's all public.

And I said, "But the bigger point is that
what works in milieu may not work elsewhere," okay. What works in Britain where we have very high, you know, response -- or very high coverage and good response rates through a firm, high quality Internet firm, may not work as well elsewhere. And the other thing is, you know, it may not work even in the United States. It's not just between, you know, a developing country and a developed country. It may just not work as well as in the United States as it works in the case of -- in the British case. I said, "Our fundamental point is this is empirical." It's an empirical thing. Everybody has got vast nonresponse problems now. Do not confuse Kish and Campbell. In others, it's a little aphorism. Do not confuse Kish and Campbell. Kish developed the statistical theoretical basis for doing the ideal face variety anyway you want to do it actually. Mode doesn't matter for Kish.

But that is not what we achieve in practice with any mode. We're not anywhere close. We were a -- you could sort of dream about it back in the '50s when you were getting 85 percent, but not now. And so it's really an empirical question. If we're willing to buy the face-to-face results -- and I think there's some reasons sometimes not to buy them -- and we get exactly the same results with our Internet surveys -- and

I'm encouraged that we have got a real good future here for these kinds of projects in a particular milieu, okay. And I think you've got to test it. You've got to test it.

Now, we have done studies in Canada and the United States as well. I've done a 2006 Canadian National Election Study and also by the Internet with YouGov and a 2006 American congressional election study by the Internet. And, again, the same idea is, do I get the same kind of -- do these data look like they should look like, based on all the other kinds of stuff we have got out there. The answer in both cases is, yes, right on the money. It's the same kinds of inferences. They look just the same. You wouldn't know what the mode was if I didn't tell you, okay. And so that is encouraging.

The American -- both of these are reported in a book that we have got called MAKING POLITICAL CHOICES, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, coming out with the University of Toronto Press later this year. But it's -- you know, the findings are so standard in a way that you -- you'd never even think about it. Once we got going working with it, we never thought about mode again. Because we've got -- we've been analyzing ANES and CES data, you know, Al Kornberg and I and Tom Scott are working on this between the three of us for a long
time. So we didn't think about mode very much. At the beginning, we did, just doing sort of tasks and looking at this and that. We said, "Nah. This looks like election study data. Let's go."

Is there anybody here who is a member of the project, the Congressional Election Study project? You know, the one that was run by Doug Rivers and Lynn Vavreck and those people? You know, I think it's actually called the CCES. They have all these acronyms now, but the Cooperative Congressional Election Study project. I haven't seen results from that yet. I've seen some stuff that Lynn has done for a conference we did last year, but I haven't actually seen the voting behavioral models or anything. So I'm looking forward to that.

We're doing another study right now with -- with the Polimetrix side of YouGov Polimetrix called the CCAP project. Some of you may be involved with that. That is, again -- it is a cooperative campaign analysis project. This is a six-wave national Internet survey done with the Polimetrix methodology. I'll talk a little more about methodologies as well.

But it started in December, and then teams could buy in. You could buy in for one or more subsequent waves. We bought in for all the waves we
could buy in for. Very cheap, $\$ 33,000$. We're going to have five. We've got January, March, August, October and November waves. And so we've got some stuff. We're really interested in the dynamics of partisanship in the United States, a variety of things about testing the generality of the valence politics model in the face of new issue agenda, which are clearly here with us now.

And so we bought into this for 33 -imagine getting -- for $\$ 33,000$ getting five-wave national panel with 40,000 respondents or whatever the end is going to be. It's so big you don't even worry about it. It's wild.

MR. KLINEBERG: This is Internet?
MR. CLARKE: Yeah. This is Internet. It's done Polimetrix -- by YouGov/Polimetrix as they are known now, and that was a really easy decision. We did this as part of our British Election Study comparison.

Marianne.
MS. STEWART: Next slide. We're into

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that topic.
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MR. CLARKE: Mode doesn't matter. Internet survey is the future. Cost effective. Insanely huge N's. Super fast. Cool experiments.

Do you want me to talk about the experiments?

MS. STEWART: Uh-huh. For 10 minutes, yeah.

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. A couple of things. One of the things you're going to be interested in as social scientists in the Internet is the ease with which you can do really sophisticated experiments involving audio and visual stimuli. In the 2005 British Election Study, we started to experiment with this kind of stuff doing something called a feedback to respondent. Feedback to respondent experiment was designed to test one of the fundamental assumptions of Downsian spatial competition theory, namely, the exogeneity of -- you know, taste exogeneity that, as you know, the idea is that voters have preferences in a linear multidimensional issue space. Very simple model. They assess where candidates and parties are. They look at those loss functions and they pick the one that will maximize their utilities. It's a very, very simple model.

And we said, "Well, gee, you know, that's one straight -- but there's like 50 years of social psychology that says that's not true; that people do -and indeed we studied political campaigns and a lot of the stuff we studied has to do with people shifting around and do they shift, do they move in result if they get stimuli. So we said, "Okay. Let's go ahead, take a
traditional -- two of the traditional dimensions in British sort of Downsian modeling." One is a tax cut thing. You know, cut taxes -- do you want to cut taxes even if it means we're going to reduce services or are you willing to pay more taxes to get more public services, which is the sort of -- that's the left/right one, if you will, although they actually ask left/right using those terms as well in the BES surveys.

The second one is punish criminals versus rights of the accused dimension, all right. That's sort of authoritarian/libertarian dimension. We said, okay, we will ask people where they are in these dimensions. We'll ask them where they put the major parties, and we'll just do this in a very standard way. Then at the end of the survey, we're going to come back and we're going to show them a two-dimensional space on their computer and it's going to have them located in this space. "Here you are." Okay. And then we are going to do a variety of treatments for -- you know, we've got this big N, so we can do a whole bunch of different treatments. And the treatments involve presentation of positions of parties and/or leaders and sometimes leaders are identified as, you know, liberal leader or liberal Democratic leader Charles Kennedy or Labour leader Tony Blair, et cetera, and sometimes they're not.

And the idea was, do people move in reaction to those stimuli relative to your control group that didn't have any stimuli, we just had the individual out in the space? And the finding, perhaps not surprisingly, at least to me, was that people moved. They did move, okay, significantly. And moreover what matters were partisan cues, not leader cues for this. So it wasn't just that -- you know, there wasn't just a general sort of like, hey, there's another object and we move toward it, which would have been a troubling sort of counterhypothesis. No. It's partisan stuff. It's the partisan stuff that moves them and it is an attraction, not a repulsion thing. You know, there is a possibility of sort of a spider sat down beside him and you move away kind of thing. That's not it. Consistently, people move toward -- toward cues.

MR. KLINEBERG: You identify with the Labour Party and you hear a message from a neighbor here, it moves you in that direction?

MR. CLARKE: That's right. That's right. So this is just an illustration. But the idea is we gather information, we present it back to the respondent; that provides a basis for the experiment involving this visual cue. Of course, you could do all sorts of other things. You can show them pictures of Tony Blair. You
can show them picture of the buses blowing up in -- at the time of $7 / 7$ with the terrorist attacks in London a couple years ago. You can do all sorts of stuff. And so we're experimenting more with that right now.

We're going to do a bunch more experiments. We're interested in immigration, for example, and attitudes toward immigrants. Threats -there are various kind of threats. We're doing some work with Jim Gibson, who some of you may know, who worked on tolerance in this country and elsewhere, South Africa and elsewhere. We're going to do an entire British minority election study, which hopefully, if they give us the money, which will involve a bunch of experiments having to do with attitudes toward minority groups, particularly immigrants.

So it's all sort of stuff you can do. You can do some of this -- you can do virtually none of this by telephone, okay, or very limited, hardly any of it by telephone. You can do some experiments, but you can't really do very much, okay, historically. Now, once we get like -- with phone records changing, of course, with cell, you know, you get these phones that show things, you can do them face to face by turning the computer around so to speak, okay, but that's really cumbersome. That's really cumbersome. Talk about
something, "Oh, here's my computer. Take a look at this." I think that's not going to work very well. You can do it. It's really easy on the Internet. People expect to see pictures. It's just seamless. It's easy, okay. And again, it's cheap. The British findings travel well. That's what I mentioned before, how far is it from Wivenhoe Park to Ann Arbor to Montreal to wherever. There's encouraging findings from what we've done so far.

And then we talked a little bit about where we might go in the future; more mode comparison, more experiments. We're going to have a truly huge Internet campaign survey this time. Absolutely humongous compared to what we've done before. At least, 400 people every day, ideally 500. We actually want to have the dream of like the independent study every day during the campaign. That's what we want. We really want to do a little time series analysis or really get even to where we do multilevel modeling in confidence, and it's a story and so we can get it and so we are going to do it.

Monthly continuous monitoring survey. Okay. I want to make sure I mention this, okay. Some of you may -- how many of you know of Lupita-Mutz, the TESS project? Are you familiar with TESS? How many of you have actually done stuff with TESS? Have you?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.
MR. CLARKE: Are they using Internet now exclusively or partially?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Not when we did it. It was telephone. I mean, the "T" is for telephone. Time sharing. It's time sharing.

MR. CLARKE: It's time sharing experiments in the social sciences. I need to talk to Skip about whether they're strict. I know they're partly Internet now.

The deal is in Britain with the election study -- again, there's only one team that gets an election study, even with the advantages that we're talking about here this morning with the Internet mode. What we want to do is -- and we are going to do is to develop a TESS-like project called the Continuous Monitoring Survey in Britain. Every month starting in July, we'll be interviewing at least 1,000 people and we'll have a core questionnaire and then a periphery, if you will, where anyone, including people in this room of course, can submit proposals to us which will be reviewed by our editorial, quote/unquote, our advisory board for the study, like an editorial board for a journal. And if the proposal is accepted, we will then go ahead and schedule you for doing your experiment or just your
regular question battery. It doesn't have to be an experiment. We will do experiments as well, you know, assuming they're feasible; that we can do it technically. Some things you can't do, are too expensive or can't do at all. But that's going to be part of this as well.

You could see like how this expands again the frame, you know, the opportunity. The opportunities become massive for people to be involved. And user community actually do work now on a continuing basis, not every four or five years, because we know a lot of that stuff that's really interesting happens in between elections, all right. That's why you want to do continuous monitoring.

And also experiments you may want to do in public opinion, doing them during an election campaign is actually the worst time you could do them. It's absolutely atypical. There are all sorts of stimuli going on that are clouding the picture, so you don't want to do them then. And historically you have no opportunity really to do them any other time or very limited opportunities. You might be working -- maybe this university has got like a survey research center so you could do something here in Houston or in Texas; but to mount a national survey, historically, is impossible. And this stuff is all free, by the way. This is totally
free. It's totally free, so you don't have to do anything but send us your proposal.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: This is starting in July 2009?

MR. CLARKE: It starts in July of this year. Now, we may actually start the test part of it a little bit later because we have to get our website up and get things organized, but certainly not more than a month or two.

MR. KLINEBERG: So you got this from YouGov and it's a --

MR. CLARKE: No. This is like the grant for the British Election Study for 2009/2010. It has a face-to-face component. It has the Internet component, which is the campaign survey, plus the continuous monitoring survey.

MR. KLINEBERG: So this is Britain?

MR. CLARKE: This is in Britain. But there's lots of things that you say -- you know, sort of convenience where you are. Britain is great for what I want to do because $I$ can study this. If it is that way, then we're interested in your proposal.

The idea is to work with people. The proposals have to be topically relevant. I mean, there's a range of things that you might want to study that are
really outside of our framework, like juvenile delinquency and things. We're not going to go there, okay. Those are good topics. You have got to have another problem.

You know, we want stuff basically that have to do with political topics, you know, opinions, attitudes and behaviors about political topics. So topical relevance, all right. Theoretical motivation, of course. You have to tell us like what, how do you -- you know, what are we testing here? What's this about, you know? You didn't just find this written in a telephone booth or something like this. You know, this is actually testing, you know, a proposition that's interesting, is an issue here, a scientific issue.

And then third is to say administrative feasibility. There will be limits to what we do. You know, we're providing this gratis. And we'll say to YouGov, "Yeah. These guys want to experiment with pictures of this, that and that," and that's fine. But if they had to do a lot of software development, then it went beyond. We'll let you know right away. The idea is to work with people, too. If we like the idea in general but it's got some hairs on it or what have you and we got to work with it a little bit, we will give you an R\&R basically.

Yes?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well, this is a general question, $I$ guess. I believe the Internet can be used for these kind of, you know, surveys, et cetera, et cetera. Obviously, the scope is very limited, right. As you mentioned, people in Albania, it's not going to work there.

MR. CLARKE: Not yet.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Probably in 30 years or so. But my question is, I understand how a probability sample is made. I understand that. However, what is a little bit nebulous is how this company designed the sample. Why this e-mail and not this e-mail, on the one hand?

And on the other hand, what about reliability and how -- I mean, probably you got lucky here in 2005 and that's why you have -- everything matches so nicely, right? And as you said at the beginning, if it's too simple, probably it's not right.

So, I mean, how can I be confident that if I replicate whatever this Polimetrix or YouGov did, I'm going to get the same thing, since you are using the same people that you had at the beginning? So I mean what's your take on that?

MS. STEWART: Do you want to speak to
that, about data quality? And I'll talk a little bit about coverage.

MR. CLARKE: Okay. Yeah.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And also

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minorities, right. I mean, that's --
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MR. CLARKE: You've got a number of questions there that we can deal with and are interesting to talk about.

We have done a lot of -- we have actually been running continuous monitoring surveys in Britain using telephone and more recently Internet mode since 1992 actually. I talked Bob Wybrow into letting us do this stuff for free with Gallup at one time before they got bought out by Gallup US. So we've been doing this for a long time.

And so we've got these sort of standard models of voting behavior, and we run them cross-mode, okay. We have done it a million times. We have done it more recently with the YouGov -- related YouGov project that we run monthly surveys with, and what's really striking is the extent to which the same models work again and again and again and again and again with different sample, okay, with different sample.

And not just regression-type models, but some of the stuff we have done, confirmatory factor
analysis models we have done of the structure of public service evaluations and things like this, a variety of topics. So once you leave the world of Leslie Kish -and if $I$ can convince you this morning of one thing, I hope you will believe no matter what mode you use, we're not in that world, okay. Now, it would be great to get back there, but we're not there.

MR. KLINEBERG: Nothing will get us back there; right?

MR. CLARKE: No. I don't think anything we can think about will get us back there.

So that's it. Then, I mean, one option is just to give the game up and say, "We can't do this stuff."

The other view, though, is to do empirical work, comparing what we think is the very best surveys done with the gold standard methodologies against what we're doing with, for example, the Internet. And we have done a lot of these comparison studies, and they're very encouraging.

MR. KLINEBERG: Now, they are consistent and lots of other studies have been done similarly.

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. Of course, also, when you do a traditional survey -- remember, you say, you have repeated random samples -- you have an infinite
number of repeated random samples. We will have a population parameter, you know, X bar, which is equal to U or something like this, right? Hey, we don't have. We have got one. We've got one, okay. We always have one.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And this is only for voting -- in particular for voting issues; right? I mean, all of this is only for voting and that's it?

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. This is what I'm saying, one of the things is what works in one milieu -this is Don Dillman's point. He made it largely with regard to using different devices to maximize response rates, what he called his tailored survey method. But I think it applies like a fortiori to the questions about mode and what is really useful for doing the kinds of work we do as political scientists in Great Britain or Canada or the United States may not be the way you want to design surveys to study minority populations living in South Dallas or, for that matter, in the British case.

We wanted to do --
MR. KLINEBERG: Hispanic immigrants in this city are much the same.

MR. CLARKE: Of course. And in Britain. So if we do this Benz project, we get funded for that, we are actually going to do face-to-face interviewing. We'll do some work with the Internet to start learning
about what we can do for -- and maybe by telephone as well to see about mode comparisons. But the fundamental methodology will be face-to-face interviewing. Now, it's not going to be a probability sample, okay. It's going to be some kind of snowball kind of sampling thing, I believe, to the extent what we have learned so far.

But the costs per interview are so high that we could not have accommodated in the British -- it would have been the tail that like ate the dog. It would be like that. The cost for interviews are absolutely enormous to do this work. So we have to put in for a separate, what they call, response mode bid. We will go to both the ESRC, I'm sure to the NSF here, maybe Pew. You know, we'll try to get some more funds to do this.

This thing will be almost as expensive as the entire British Election Study, just to study the minorities, and then we won't even have national coverage. It will be a study probably -- and it'll be London, for sure, and it may well be Birmingham and what have you. We're not sure yet, but that's what you're really facing. And so it's very expensive. It's very expensive, but you have -- if you want to have some reasonable data set, you've got to go a different way. So that's my general message here.

MS. STEWART: Your comment points to
several things, one of which is coverage that Harold is touching on and you had just mentioned, too. Right now, there are unreachable -- Internet unreachable populations or groups. It could be because they live in poor countries, which the Internet infrastructure is not available or Internet infrastructure is available but it's highly government censored.

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. China.
MS. STEWART: China, United Arab Emirates, et cetera. It could be because people are members of poor groups that, by definition, they can't afford even the cheapest computer and connectivity.

So that's all true, but the other thing that's true is face-to-face is, as we keep saying, prohibitively expensive. Telephone is increasingly less reliable. There's a whole stratum of population you can't reach through telephone surveys. Young people don't have land lines. They often have cell phones. There is no national cell phone directory or sampling frame, so you can't get that. Well, they're one of the most critical groups for a lot of reasons, okay. If you're studying -- we know that voter turnout rates amongst the 18 - to 25 -year old segment of the population has really dropped. You can't get to them through face to face, right.

MR. KLINEBERG: I thought you could get
cell phone.
MR. CLARKE: Maybe you can now.
MR. KLINEBERG: That's just changing.
MS. STEWART: Is it?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Gallup has
introduced the cell phone component to its surveys, but I'm not sure what frame they're using.

MS. STEWART: It will be interesting to find out.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Either that or they made a breakthrough.

MS. STEWART: It may be that -- I talked to some of my criminology colleagues, Internet surveys for the kinds of things that we're interested in, which have to do with crime recidivism among certain prison populations don't make sense.

So the point of story is there some big research question there. There's some big topic of interest. But it may just be that for slice of time, whatever that is, multi modes are going to get you the models that you need to estimate in order to get the answers that you want to try to get, which used to be a bad thing. Oh, no, you can't mix up the modes too much. Well, you know, you're going to have to.

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. Our research suggests, at least for the political stuff in Britain, as I say, it doesn't matter. You can. You can, if you want to do the kinds of stuff that political scientists typically do.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That was actually one of my questions that $I$ was going to ask you, is what have you-all done for the cell phone component in the samples in the U.K. where we actually were able to obtain a sample here -- we're actually survey sampling. You can actually get them now in an RDD format and put them in, you know, add your percentages that you have tried. So we were actually reasonably successful with that.

MR. CLARKE: That's great.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: But I was wondering if you-all were using that.

MR. CLARKE: We have not, but YouGov is very interested in that kind of stuff. If you talk to Joe Twyman, who is our service director or some of their other people, they are very much in tune with this idea. There are more cell phones in Britain than there are men, women, children, dogs, cats, birds, et cetera.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Here it's 15 to 18 percent that people don't have the actual land lines at home.

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. There's nobody under the age of 30 in Britain with a land line, things like this. And so you want to be interested in this technology as a way of doing this stuff, and they are.

MS. STEWART: So ideally if you're going multi-mode, you're going to end up with some core set of questions you can ask people, but clearly some of the visuals that are interesting in order to get manual line -- causal mechanisms on Internet you can't do with telephone.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I suspect, though, with the Internet you are picking up some of the younger folks from the Internet as opposed to the old folks. So you are kind of balancing out the cell phone as opposed to the, $I$ would suspect that, right?

MS. STEWART: Yeah. You can use the mode for multimodes as a compensating sample.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Right.
MR. CLARKE: It's interesting. Just look at the demographics, one of the things we did -- and actually we published this as an appendix to the Political Analysis paper. Just look at the unweighted demographics for the face to face and the Internet surveys. You say, oh, gee, what would be think -- where do you think the skew would mainly be with the Internet?

Well, people typically say age, young people. It's education. It's education. In Britain, at least, it's education. That was the one big one that jumped up.

MR. KLINEBERG: Age plays a role as well.
MR. CLARKE: Age plays a role, but age is correlated with education. But it's not -- it's still that correlation is going away because Britain, like the United States, now has a mass of higher education. And they have achieved this, in part, by just taking all the community colleges and universities, which was one way of quickly expanding it. We really expanded higher education.

MS. STEWART: Well, Harold, we're doing that in Texas.

MR. CLARKE: I know. They do it everywhere. But the point is, it's education and it really jumps out at you. Just scan that table --

MR. KLINEBERG: That's a pretty powerful bias.

MR. CLARKE: But it's irrelevant. The interesting thing is it's irrelevant to these models. There's always literature on political sophistication, of course. You say, well, gee, that would suspect there wouldn't be -- you know, that we would find differences. And so we have pursued this actually in our book

PERFORMANCE POLITICS, which will be hopefully coming out with Cambridge a little later this year as well. And we actually have looked at -- because we're interested in issues, in valence issues.

How does political sophistication work? Well, we actually developed some what we call mix logent models. I don't know if any of you guys do this kind of stuff. Garrett Glasgow from Political Science has pioneered these. You're basically taking a parameter for variable, like party leaders in our case, or issues, another one, valence issues I mentioned and declaring that thing as a random variable.

And then parameterize it in terms of a political sophistication variable, which we measure as an interaction of level of formal education and amount of political knowledge. So you have got information and you know how to process it.

And we had three hypotheses there, and one of them was that there would be a linear effect. Just more sophisticated people would be more Downsian basically, okay. They would not pay as much attention to the leaders as cues. Leaders are sort of easy information cues. And they wouldn't pay as much attention to valence issues.

The second hypothesis was that it would
be a curvilinear thing. That people get some information -- the easy information is about leaders. So leader effects go up and then they go down. Then the third one -- we call that the smart money hypothesis.

That is, the third hypothesis we call the really smart money hypothesis, which are the guys who have read Lupita and McCubbins and so forth, and they know -- they don't care on diversity and so on. There aren't very many people like this probably. But then they suggest -- I also suggest a quadratic effect, but it's shaped the other way. So that people who are really smart, they just go right to the leaders because they know -- they live in a world of sort of radical uncertainty. We have got to get a cue. We don't know what's going to happen. But this guy, whoever he is, will be here -- or whoever she is, is the person we want in charge. It turns out that the smart money hypothesis works.

However, having done all this work and spent months developing these models, the purchase you get in terms of explanation using your AICs and BICs and so on, suggests, yeah, you can go there, but there isn't a lot of reason to do so. You really don't get a stronger model statistically by doing this. You may say, well, yeah, there's some nice insights there and I can
talk to my friends at Starbucks about this or whatever, you know. This is fun. I can impress my friends with my mixed logent models. But statistically it doesn't look like there's a lot of reason to go there, okay.

MR. KLINEBERG: So response rate does not matter as much as we thought? Self-selection does not create as many bias as we thought?

MR. CLARKE: It doesn't matter. No.
The other thing about Britain is that the models that work now worked 50 years ago. There's some really interesting stuff there. The stuff that worked -the valence politics model is not only good now. It was good when Butler and Stokes -- when Don Stokes first went to Nuffield in 1963. It works.

Party identification. One of the great things about the British study is they got all sorts of panels, okay. And we're able to study the dynamics of party ID. Party ID in Britain has big-time dynamics all the way back to the '60s, okay. It's not that the world used to be the way that Angus Campbell described it in 1960. It never was that way in Britain. And it wasn't that -- and, also, McCutcheon and I have done a paper coming hopefully from the NLQ where it shows it was not like that in the States either back in the '50s.

The panel data we have suggests that what
we call these generalized user stair models, which are a generalization of the converse models which we estimate, those things work just as well with the 1956 to '60s now as they do with the 1992 to 1996 panel. And they suggest the same thing.

At the latent variable level, you know, there's lots of movers out there and there always have been, okay. And so it's not just the things -- like one of the things is back in the great days of the gold standard, we got 85 percent response rates and all this stuff was done ever so carefully and so forth and everybody was honest and there's no social desirability biases or anything. Everybody spoke their mind like good midwestern people they were. It was a different world. It doesn't look like it. What strikes me is how similar things are over time.

MR. KLINEBERG: So it really wasn't that different.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: A more modest question about, you two have done a lot of work on these models of voting and turnouts. I mean, you know a lot about those things.

But what about if I wanted to go to YouGov and do a study on vote intentions, I feel pretty good about doing that because I can read your paper and
stuff. What if $I$ want to go there and get data on predicting placement on 11-point scales or something or on political ethics, you know, some things are squishier and we don't know as much about, are you buying into sort of --

MR. CLARKE: Well, we've got all that stuff.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You could do a unique comparison with 2005 data on that?

MR. CLARKE: Sure. Sure. I think that's really -- what you want to do -- and you can do a lot with the 2005 data. I welcome you to download the data and go to it -- is to start doing an inventory. Let's start branching out, looking at a variety of different -like interesting -- I think we have worked on party identification in the models in the Internet and the dynamics look a lot like the face to face, but there are other things. There's stuff like on advocacy. There's stuff on political knowledge, measuring political knowledge.

We mentioned the education bias. So you say, gee, wow, we have a lot more knowledgeable people. It's the structure. It's not just the means on these variables. But what's the structure like? Does, for example, the internal and external advocacy, do you get
the same kind of structure? Do you get two factors? Do you get one?

I think there's a really rich sort of set of comparisons that we can do to expand our knowledge. We have lots of things we want to know yet. There's stuff we can do in the lab, too, like psychology kinds of lab experiments in terms of here is how the Internet presents an 11-point scale or, at least, this is how YouGov does it. Here is how Polimetrix does it. And they actually -- I found out by actually now working on the CCAP project with Lynn Vavreck and these people, they do it differently. And I said, "Lynn, I don't think you're right. I think this is wrong. I think this is going to give you some very different data." She said, "Well, $I$ don't have money for a programmer to fix it, Harold. If you want to try to fix it, you can do it." I said, oops.

Anyway, there's lots of stuff that we may want to do in lab setting, like just writing lab. Say, hey, go to your friend in the psychology department and say, "Look, let's do some experimentations and see whether it makes a difference within an Internet mode. Would it make a difference if we did it this way or this way or we had the pointer up here is here as opposed to over here and so on." There's a bunch of that stuff that
we need to know.

Krosnick has done some of this stuff in his work when he was at Ohio State, but there's a lot more to do it yet to learn that kind of stuff. But you're right, there's lots of stuff we can do and you can do it with the 2005.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You can use that sort of a Rosetta stone?

MR. CLARKE: That's right. Get started.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just go to the future and just to Internet. But you can feel confident that's -- because I talk to people, you know, in political science and I say, "I've got somebody to do YouGov this summer." They are like, "Oh, geez, I wouldn't" -- people are skeptical. So if you want to write something with this stuff, you have to worry is it worth your time, you know, doing this stuff. But I think I'm okay if $I$ can sort of go back to the study and sort of --

MR. CLARKE: Psychoanalysis paper.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: A psychoanalysis paper, that would be good, so...

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. And you can, like you said, validate it. This is worth validating. I'm going to develop this project, but to begin with I need to know
whether I'm getting equivalent measures. Well, gosh, the 2005 BES allows me to look at the efficacy batteries or whatever, and so that gives me confidence and then away you go or, no, it suggests caution, I need to do more work, I need to learn more. Yeah, I think that's exactly the way to do it. Right. Sure.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Right.

MR. CLARKE: Guy?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I was wondering, sort of around those lines of areas that people have skepticism, I guess, sort of Hawthorne effect where these people are participating in all these surveys --

MR. CLARKE: Panel conditioning signs.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- on wine or dog food and then a political one, but does that somehow make them different. And I know that's a tricky one to try to measure.

MR. KLINEBERG: Certainly different meaning eager to do surveys? That's not a usual trait.

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. I mean, there are some people who are professional survey takers as you know. They can make enough money to buy a six pack every week or whatever they want to do.

But, no. I think that's right. You know, in general, because we do multi-wave panels in
various modes because we're interested in dynamics of attitudes and behavior and so on, panel conditioning is always a question and sort of the main hypothesis is that people try to be consistent in their behavior and so you minimize dynamics really in terms of measurement. But that's a good point.

Now, whether that would be greater in the Internet or not -- see, most of the stuff -- if you're a YouGov panelist -- I don't know if you are or not. But if you are -- it's not meant to become one. And what you find is that most of the surveys you get, the vast majority are about soap flakes kinds of surveys, you know, and dog food and stuff like this. They're not about political topics.

And you might just -- once in a while, you might turn out to be a person who gets the YouGov telegraph monthly survey and then gets the BES coming in the next day, but that would be very, very rare. Because they try to control that, you know, because they can. When they go out of their cell grid, they're not going to pick you if they just picked you to do the tele survey. They'll pick somebody just like you in your grid. They do that, you know, because they're selecting anyway. So they can choose randomly, but they can still, "oh, not Whit. We just asked him yesterday."

MR. KLINEBERG: So they do that, they tag them and say --

MR. CLARKE: Well, they look to make sure they're not oversampling these guys. I mean, this I haven't actually done, but this is what they tell me. So that they won't pick you -- if I pick you for the political survey yesterday and your name just happens to come up for the BES the next day, they'll avoid you, you know. Maybe they will miss once in a while, but they try to avoid it.

MR. KLINEBERG: Your sense is that this is what the future is going to be?

MR. CLARKE: I think it's going to be -it's got to be something other than what it is. There are reasons theoretically, even if face to face was as cheap as it was in 1956, that we have got to do more. It is so slow. Its ability to capture dynamics, you know, like all these models that we have where we just blithely put T, T minus 1, T minus 2 on these repeated measures. And they're like one panel is every two or three years, we're submitting an election panel. And the other guys are interviewing like, you know, a month apart or something. This is not the same. And the psychologists would say, "This is crazy. You can't do this. This is not the same."

And so there are reasons we want to do other kinds of work and we want to get outside the lab. And the college sophomores -- you know, bless their hearts, occasionally at least -- you know, they're limited. One thing we know, one thing we know is that if we want to generalize, that it's going to be really hard. You know, the external validity off that is always problematic; and we're in much better shape if we have a national sample that we're running our experiments on, other things being equal. And if these guys are getting it right again and again and again and again, then, you know, this is probably a pretty good way to go.

MR. KLINEBERG: Well, let me ask you a personal question. I mean, we have been doing this survey by telephone every year for 27 years. We want to continue this in a comparability. Response rates were in the high 70s in the beginning. They're in the low 40s or high 30s today. The responses seem to be as good as they have ever been. You know, when you compare, for example, ratings of job opportunities with official unemployment rates, the parallelism of those two curves is as great today as it was 30 years or 40 years ago. Shouldn't we just continue what we're doing?

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. I was going to say, what's your question? It seems to me --

MR. KLINEBERG: Should we combine?

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. It seems to me
that -- you know, there's always this question about these guys, who are these guys who aren't there? If there aren't many of them, you could sort of pass it off. Maybe you shouldn't -- maybe you shouldn't pass it off because it's easy to imagine a situation where it makes a difference, even if you're getting 85 percent. But, yeah, I don't know.

I worry when response rates get that -well, I may worry about the survey enterprise in general. I mean, $I$ don't like the idea that the Internet has got 52 percent. I would like a much higher rate. I don't like the idea that our face to face is just 60 percent.

MR. KLINEBERG: The Internet is not a probability sample, so that seems to me to be a serious challenge.

MR. CLARKE: Well, it is. But imagine --
MS. STEWART: It is now, but it won't be
10 years from now.
MR. KLINEBERG: That's right.

MR. CLARKE: No, no. But imagine this. Imagine this. Imagine you've got a list, okay. You've got a list. And you know 70 percent of the people, which is about what you're telling me, 60 to 70 percent, you
don't interview, okay. And you have got to make this heroic assumption that the 30 percent that are there are just a random subset of the guys --

MR. KLINEBERG: They seem to be.
MR. CLARKE: They seem to be. Well, that's great if they are. I mean, it's really good news.

MR. KLINEBERG: It's remarkable.
MR. CLARKE: I mean, we can have good news in social sciences. It's quite possible.

There are two things that we don't like to talk about very much. One is that things can go right as well as go wrong and also that we actually might learn something, we might know something. Is it really possible that we actually know why people vote? You know, it's a radical thought, but it's quite possible.

I mean, it's a really serious sort of question on both sides, because the problem is with -you know, you've got this nonprobability sample because people are opting in. But with the traditional modes, they're opting out in vast numbers, you know. And so you say, gee, are those guys who are still left, the soldiers still standing, are they representative of the larger group that you originally started off with when you went over the top? I don't know.

MR. KLINEBERG: The demographics from the
census is as good today as they did --
MR. CLARKE: Yeah. Well, you may be in a very happy situation then. You know, you may well be in a great situation.

One of the things I want to do -- I'm going to try to do, you know, I hope we can do with the 2009 study is get a little more information about the face to face, like we talk in traditional modes, about the guys who do not participate, okay? Because right now, they don't give us any information about nonrespondents, but they know a fair amount about these guys. We know a lot.

We can do this, quote, neighborhood stuff that Ron Johnson, this famous political geographer in Britain. We can learn a lot about the characteristics of the nonrespondents, okay, right down to the level of the streets they're on and so on and so forth. We could -we could actually make some inference -- you know, do some comparisons between the guys who answer and those who don't. And I think that's worth doing because it starts to move towards the -- well, we don't know about their attitudes to be sure and that may be what differentiates them, but we can certainly start to make some moves on this. I think we should. It's well worth doing because it's a really big question.

Forget about the Internet. Just deal
with your question. Traditional modes, massive nonresponsive, is this a problem? And you say, gee, it's really encouraging. The comparisons I've done and so on, it looks just as good now as it did 30 years ago. That's great.

But I'm not sure if that's true again for the political surveys. So political surveys are, by their nature, sort of sensitive beasts. And it may well be that the people who don't -- I'll give you an example, real fast. Let's go back. Quebec, sovereignty referendum, 1995, you've got a very close division of the vote, extremely close. You have got three population groups. You have got the Francophones, you know, the French-Canadian community, traditional community. You have got the English speakers, the Anglophone community.

And then you have got a third force. You have got people who are immigrants, the so-called Allophones. Allophones differentially don't answer the survey, okay. A lot of them come from countries where you're asked about whether you support the country or whether they're going to leave the country or you're going to get shot if you give the wrong answer to the question and so they're not answering, but they're voting. There's good evidence that these people are
going to vote, and they're going to vote massively pro Canada. They came to Canada because they like Canada. They do not want to move to Quebec and see Quebec leave. That's not what they want. They came to be part of Canada. But the question is how many are going to vote and what the division is going to be.

Public opinion pollsters made the division 2 to 1 pro Canada and readjusted their polls that way. See the panels, you know, back of the envelope, whatever.

We did it using Gary -- one of these algorithms, like these Ruben kind of algorithms that Gary King popularized in political science.

And we developed this really big multiple imputation model that came up like 69 percent or something like his. It's hardly different. So we spent all this time, and it came out just about the same, you know. But we were worried. The idea is you're worried. There are reasons why, with some of these political surveys, where you're worried about this stuff.

And again, in this case, we wanted a point estimate. We really wanted to know what the division of the vote was going to be. Typically, as I say, we're not -- I don't care about that, but we did in this case. And you care about some of these things in
your surveys. You really want to know what the distribution of opinion is, and then those things that I think this becomes -- you know, I don't know much about that right now. I don't know much about that except empirically, votes look the same, turnout is bad, but it's bad for everything, so...

MR. GRANATO: We have time for one more question.

MR. KLINEBERG: To follow up on Guy's general theme of concerns about Internet survey, you had mentioned the '92 where the British pollsters got it wrong. And one of the reasons I've heard to account for this is that they -- they use quota sampling, and the census had been done like eight years ago and so the weights that they developed based upon the census weren't in some sense really reflective of the demographic -- the current demographics in '92. And in many ways, what's going on is similar with the Internet surveys. There are 48 cells, and then they are drawing proportionately. That's the quota sampling.

So then the question is proportional relative to census, about how long ago was the last census and how comfortable do we feel following the last census when it wasn't done prior to 2005? When was the last time it would have been done? By 2009 then. You
know, is this a concern? Can we go do data census? Are we stuck with sometime eight-year-old data?

MR. GRANATO: The census gives you estimates, right?

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. Let me -- you know, they work -- the census in Britain, like the census in the United States, produces updated estimates on key variables. They also run these enormous, which I use in dating myself, called Cadillac kinds of face-to-face surveys with the ONS, the Office of National Statistics, and so on. So they use a variety of data, not just the 10-year-old census. These guys are -- they're not Einstein, but they're not Dobbies, you know, and so they try to get updated information.

Some of you may be familiar with the '92 case in Britain was the one where they all predicted that Labour would win and Labour got all excited and had this huge triumphant rally in Sheffield at the football stadium the week before and everything. And then, of course, the Conservatives won with a very, very small almost sort of a non -- just a barely workable majority in Parliament.

And in the wake of that, the public opinion polling -- what do they call the market research society? Yeah -- held an inquiry based in postmortem,
like what happened, you know? Who committed the crime?
And there a variety of hypotheses, and our friend, Ivor Crewe, wrote this great article called "A Nation of Liars." One of the hypotheses was that people lied; like they didn't want to admit they're Tories. Like you're nasty if you're a Tory and you're mean-spirited and so on. And so one hypothesis is quota samples are bad for the reasons, in part --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's not that they were bad, but they were outdated in some sense.

MR. CLARKE: Yeah. In this particular context, they gave misleading estimates. We stopped polling too son. People lie, but it's really about it's not -- it's really not a nice thing to say you're a conservative. So they had a variety of hypotheses.

But the effect of this was, as I said, to get them off quota sampling. That really moved them to RDD and then with the occasional, quote/unquote, Cadillac probability sample, which they would run like MORI would run just before an election. And that's how they did it, then.

And then starting in around 2000, just before the 2001 election, YouGov started doing this stuff by the Internet. And their first success was with something called the Pop Idol quiz, where they predicted
that some guy would win like 52 to 48 or something like this, and everybody else said, "No, no. Beckham is going to win it by a mile," or whoever it was, you know. And, of course, they got it dead on. And people said, "Oh, my god, they got it dead on. This is really something."

And it turns out that a lot of people are actually interested in Pop Idol. There's a lot of money to be made by associating yourself with this and running commercials on this and so on. So that got them started.

And then they predicted a whole series of elections correctly; the 2001 general election, the London -- not this one that's going on now, but the previous one. The European election, they got right on. A whole bunch of them. So they established this success.

They also -- in 2001, they gave us a gratis, just free, "Here we'll run you. Give us your survey and we'll run it for you" and that turned out actually -- we had a paper we published a few years ago, which I didn't pay much attention to at the time. Oh, yeah, it worked out really well. But they have got this string of successes, which is how they have built their reputation. I mean, maybe they're just waiting for a Literary Digest moment. I don't know.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's the concern, right, that at some level if they're sampling
from these cells and it's based, to the extent to which their sampling is based upon other data, right, in some sense, it's like data. The question is how comfortable -- you know, they got it right last time. Maybe that's --

MR. CLARKE: That's always true, as I said before. The colleagues only do one survey --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's not true with the RDD. It's always true with the political sample.

MR. CLARKE: We know that in the long run if we do these things, we are going to get to the population, but we always only do one. And so we have always got this possibility of a rogue poll. We can always have it wrong.

And one of the nice things, of course, is we do a lot -- we do a lot of commercial polls now. So we do a whole bunch. So we have sorted out the rogue. Like, in the last race election campaign, MORI had an obvious rogue. I mean, they were way off on this one and it was quickly identified because everybody else wasn't there, okay. There wasn't the big move to Labour at this point.

MR. GRANATO: What about a place like New Hampshire?

MR. CLARKE: They can get it wrong for a
variety of reasons. You can get it wrong for a variety of reasons. But I'm saying basically our problem with the election study is we're always only going to have one election study, okay. That's it. So if there's a rogue and we know we can draw -- by chance alone, we can draw rogues. We know that. And that's it, folks. There goes your $\$ 8$ million and that's what you got. And so that can happen with the very best of probability samples. That's -- that's always with us. That doesn't go away. The thing that we know, though, is that we know it's not going to happen very often.

MR. KLINEBERG: With election studies, you have got an absolutely clear objective truth out there that you can compare it to.

MR. CLARKE: Simon Jackman has got a great sort of methodology now for pooling the polls. Some of you may have seen his paper yesterday in Election 2004. So you can really put that information together really very nicely, as long as you know sample size, so...

MR. GRANATO: There will be a reception at 3 o'clock over at the Center For Public Policy. They have an informal discussion about these issues and also about the American Journal of Political Science, questions about that as well. Marianne is the editor of
that. So it will be at 3 o'clock today. And thank you very much, Harold and Marianne.
(Applause.)
(Proceedings concluded.)

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